In this paper, we analyze the security of the KMOV public key cryptosystem. KMOV is based on elliptic curves over the ring Zn where n = pq is the product of two large unknown primes of equal bit-size. We consider KMOV with a public key (n, e) where the exponent e satisfies an equation ex − (p + 1)(q + 1)y = z, with unknown parameters x, y, z. Using Diophantine approximations and lattice reduction techniques, we show that KMOV is insecure when x, y, z are suitably small.
Introduction
In the past decades, the advent of the Internet has exponentially increased the amount of data exchanged among the most diverse people, institutions and organizations, all over the world. Sensitive data exchanged between a user and a Web site needs to be encrypted to prevent it from being disclosed to or modified by unauthorized parties. Therefore, the development of secure communication has become a critical task and the most obvious way of achieving this goal is to use a cryptographic scheme to encrypt the data. Basically, there are two types of cryptography: symmetric-key cryptography and public-key cryptography. The concept of the public-key cryptography was proposed by Diffie and Hellman [4] and Merkle [8] in the mid 1970's. The first public-key cryptosystem, called RSA, was proposed in 1977 by Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman [10] . It is the most widely deployed public key cryptosystem and is used for securing web traffic in the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol and in the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. In 1991, Koyama, Maurer, Okamoto and Vanstone [7] introduced a new public key cryptosystem called KMOV. The KMOV cryptosystem is based on elliptic curves over the ring Z n where n = pq is an RSA modulus, that is, the product of two large unknown primes of equal bit-size. The KMOV public key is denoted by (n, e) where the public exponent e is an integer satisfying gcd(e, (p + 1)(q + 1)) = 1. The private exponent d is an integer satisfying ed ≡ 1 (mod (p + 1)(q + 1)). The security of RSA and KMOV is mainly based on the difficulty of factoring the RSA modulus n. To speed up the encryption or decryption one may try to use small public or secret decryption exponent. Many important papers studied RSA and KMOV to explore the weaknesses in using small exponents (see [2] and [6] ). In 1990, Wiener [12] showed that it is possible to break RSA if the private exponent d satisfies d < and |y| = O n −0.75 ex . In this paper, we consider KMOV with a public exponent e satisfying the equation ex − (p + 1)(q + 1)y = z, where x and y are co-prime positive integers. Observe that this equation has infinitely many solutions but we will focus on small solutions. We use Diophantine approximations to find x, y among the convergents of the continued fraction expansion of e n when x, y and z satisfy
.
After finding x and y, one can get an approximationp of p satisfying |p −p| < n 1 4 which leads to the factorization of n by using Coppersmith's method for finding small roots of modular polynomial equations [3] .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review some necessary definitions and notation on elliptic curves and recall the KMOV cryptosystem. In section 3, we present our new attack on KMOV. We conclude in Section 4.
Preliminaries
In this section, we give a brief description of the KMOV cryptosystem and elliptic curves (see [11] for more details on elliptic curves).
Elliptic Curves
Let p ≥ 3 be a prime. An elliptic curve over the finite field F p is an algebraic curve with no singular points, given by the Weierstrass equation
together with a single element denoted O, called the point at infinity. Given two points P, Q ∈ E p (a, b), we define a third point P + Q so that E p (a, b) forms an abelian group with this addition operation. For the special case a = 0, the order #E p (0, b) can easily be determined.
Lemma 1. Let p > 3 be a prime satisfying p ≡ 2 (mod 3) and 0 < b < p. Then
together with the point at infinity. The addition law can be extended for points in E n (a, b) and the Chinese Remainder Theorem leads to the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Let n = pq be the product of two primes and E n (a, b) an elliptic curve over Z n with gcd 4a 3 + 27b 2 , n = 1. Then for any P ∈ E n (a, b) and any integer k, we have
KMOV Scheme
The KMOV cryptosystem [7] is based on elliptic curves E n (a, b) over Z n where n = pq is an RSA modulus. The scheme works as follows.
• Key Generation 1. Find two primes, p and q with p ≡ q ≡ 2 (mod 3) and compute n = pq.
2.
Choose an exponent e co-prime to (p + 1)(q + 1) and compute d ≡ e −1 (mod (p + 1)(q + 1)).
3. Return the public key (n, e) and the private key (n, d).
• KMOV Encryption • KMOV Decryption 
The correctness of the decryption is based on Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. Indeed
where k is the integer satisfying ed = 1 + k(p + 1)(q + 1).
The New attack on the KMOV Cryptosystem
Let (n, e) be a KMOV public key with n = pq. Let x, y be co-prime positive integers. Define z by z = ex − (p + 1)(q + 1)y.
In this section, we show that, under some conditions, it is possible find x, y, p, q using only the public key (n, e) which leads to the factorization of n and breaks the system. We shall need the following useful result.
Lemma 3. Let n = pq be an RSA modulus with q < p < 2q. Then
Proof. We have (p + q)
On the other hand, since q < p < 2q, then n < p 2 < 2n and
and
This terminates the proof.
We shall also need the following result (see [5] , Theorem 184).
Theorem 1.
Let α be a real number. If x and y are positive integers such that gcd(x, y) = 1 and
then y x is one of the convergents of the continued fraction expansion of α. Now, we can prove the following theorem which permits to find x and y using the convergents of the continued fraction expansion of e n . Theorem 2. Let n = pq be an RSA modulus with q < p < 2p. Suppose that a KMOV public exponent e satisfies an equation ex − (p + 1)(q + 1)y = z with gcd(x, y) = 1 and
and |z| < (p − q)n 
If |z| < (p−q)n 
Plugging in (1), we get
Then, by Theorem 1, y x is a convergent of the continued fraction of e N . This terminates the proof. Now assume that x and y are known in the equation ex − (p + 1)(q + 1)y = z. Next, we show how to find p and q. Let us first refer to the following existing result (see [3] ).
Theorem 3 (Coppersmith) . Let n = pq be an RSA modulus with q < p < 2q. Suppose we know an approximationp of p with |p −p| < n 1 4 . Then n can be factored in time polynomial in log n.
Let us present the main result.
Theorem 4. Let n = pq be an RSA modulus with q < p < 2q. Suppose that a KMOV public exponent e satisfies an equation ex − (p + 1)(q + 1)y = z with gcd(x, y) = 1 and
and |z|
Then n can be factored in polynomial time. 
Starting with the equation ex − (p + 1)(q + 1)y = z, we get
Now, we have
Dividing by p − q + V , we get
Observe that (2) implies
On the other hand, we have p − q + V > p − q. Plugging in (3), we get
Combining this with (2), we deduce
This implies that
U +V 2
is an approximation of p up to an error term of at most n 1 4 . Then Coppersmith's Theorem 3 will find p in polynomial time and the factorization of n follows.
Conclusion
In this paper, we describe a new attack on the KMOV cryptosystem with a public key (n, e) where n = pq is an RSA modulus and e is a KMOV public exponent satisfying gcd(e, (p + 1)(q + 1)) = 1. We prove that KMOV is insecure if there exist relatively small integers x, y and z satisfying an equation ex − (p + 1)(q + 1)y = z. The attack combines the continued fraction algorithm and Coppersmith's lattice reduction based method and can be seen as an extension of Pinch's attack on small KMOV secret decryption exponents.
